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ABSTRACT
Growing concerns about low awareness and take-up rates for government support programs like college
financial aid have spurred calls to simplify the application process and enhance visibility. This project
examines the effects of two experimental treatments designed to test of the importance of simplification
and information using a random assignment research design. H&R Block tax professionals helped
low- to moderate-income families complete the FAFSA, the federal application for financial aid. Families
were then given an estimate of their eligibility for government aid as well as information about local
postsecondary options. A second randomly-chosen group of individuals received only personalized
aid eligibility information but did not receive help completing the FAFSA. Comparing the outcomes
of participants in the treatment groups to a control group using multiple sources of administrative data,
the analysis suggests that individuals who received assistance with the FAFSA and information about
aid were substantially more likely to submit the aid application, enroll in college the following fall,
and receive more financial aid. These results suggest that simplification and providing information
could be effective ways to improve college access. However, only providing aid eligibility information
without also giving assistance with the form had no significant effect on FAFSA submission rates.
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Higher education can help individuals attain social and economic success; however, decades 
of federal and state financial aid policies have not closed the substantial gap between high- and low-
income students’ college attendance rates. As studies of other benefit programs have demonstrated, 
the mere existence of a program does not ensure take-up for everyone eligible and interested (Currie 
2004). Recent research in economics and psychology demonstrates how seemingly small differences 
in sign-up procedures and marketing can lead to large differences in program participation.  For 
example, corporate savings plans that make participation the default while requiring employees to 
take action to opt-out have dramatically higher participation rates than plans that require employees 
to opt-in (Beshears et. al. 2006a).
1 In another example, making the sign-up process easier and more 
appealing (e.g. less time consuming and more convenient) has been found to increase the likelihood 
individuals open a bank account (Bertrand et al. 2006).  Consolidating and simplifying information 
can also have large effects on take up rates.  This has been found among parents deciding whether to 
transfer their children to better ranked schools (Hastings and Weinstein 2008) and in terms of the 
labor supply decisions of Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) recipients unclear about where they 
stand on the EITC schedule (Chetty and Saez, 2009).  
This paper focuses on the importance of the take-up process for college financial aid.  While 
issues around affordability and academic preparedness are often cited to explain gaps in college 
attendance rates, recent research has questioned whether the financial aid application process itself 
deters students and contributes to the gap between high- and low-income students (Dynarski and 
Scott-Clayton 2006).  The application process is not the only potential impediment. High school 
students, particularly from low-income backgrounds, often overestimate actual college tuition levels 
and underestimate financial aid opportunities (Ikenberry and Hartle 1998; Horn, Chen, and Chapman, 
2003; Kane and Avery 2004).  Given these facts, many have suggested that the complexity and 
                                                 
1 Similarly, reducing the number of necessary decisions to enroll in employee savings programs also increases 
participation (Beshears et. al. 2006b).     2
inconvenience of the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) deters many students 
(ACSFA 2001, 2005).
2  King (2004) estimates that 850,000 college students who were eligible for 
federal grant aid in 2000 did not complete the FAFSA, and based on this and other research, in 2006, 
the Federal Commission on the Future of Higher Education concluded that many students “don’t 
enter college because of inadequate information and rising costs, combined with a confusing 
financial aid system” (p. vii). 
Concerns about the low visibility of aid programs and the complexity of the aid process have 
spurred calls to provide more assistance in filling out the form and to enhance the visibility of 
programs by educating students about the availability of financial aid.
3 However, there is little 
rigorous research on how to implement these efforts in a practical manner and whether such efforts 
would truly improve college outcomes and aid receipt. 
Our paper attempts to quantify the effects of simplification, assistance, and information by 
examining a randomized field experiment conducted in partnership with H&R Block, an accounting 
firm that provides tax preparation assistance to over 20 million households a year. The experiment 
focused on low- and moderate-income families where at least one member was between the ages of 
17 and 30 and did not have an undergraduate degree.  After families completed their tax returns and 
consented to participate, we randomly assigned them to one of three groups.  The first group received 
help completing the FAFSA using a streamlined process that entailed using the family’s tax return to 
pre-populate the FAFSA and then completing the rest of the form using a brief interview protocol. As 
Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2006) note, “the [basic tax return] already collects most of the key 
pieces of data that determine aid eligibility” (p. 4).  This first group was also offered to have the 
                                                 
2 The FAFSA also serves as the basis to award most state and institutional need-based aid, and so it is a critical 
gatekeeper to most college financial aid. 
3 Previous efforts to simplify and improve aid information include the creation of the FAFSA-EZ and the FAFSA-
4caster. However, in order to determine whether one can use the FAFSA-EZ, families must first answer a series of 
complex questions of the sort that make the regular FAFSA challenging.  Moreover, the FAFSA-4caster requires a 
great deal of information before giving an estimate. In June 2009, the Department of Education (DOE) announced a 
plan to use skip logic in the online version of the FAFSA to eliminate questions that do not apply to some students 
as well as give students instant estimates of the Pell Grant and student loan eligibility.  The DOE is also exploring 
ways to transfer information directly from the IRS to the online FAFSA (U.S. DOE 2009).  These efforts still 
require families to be aware of the FAFSA and able to complete it online, preferably with high-speed internet.     3
FAFSA submitted and was provided immediate personalized aid estimates along with net tuition cost 
information for four nearby public colleges.  The second randomly-selected group received only 
personalized aid eligibility estimates based on data from their tax return as well as information on the 
tuition costs of nearby colleges, but they did not receive help completing the FAFSA.  The final set 
of individuals are those who were randomly assigned into a control group, which only received a 
brochure on the importance of higher education and general information on college costs and 
financial aid. 
Our experiment serves as a test of the importance of simplifying the process of getting 
financial aid and providing clear information about eligibility. The interventions also address several 
major barriers in the current financial aid system, including lack of awareness about aid programs, 
misinformation about college costs, and missed aid application deadlines.  For example, the 
interventions gave students accurate information about local tuition costs and individual eligibility 
for financial aid. Additionally, many students miss deadlines for state and institutional aid programs, 
which also rely on the FAFSA to award aid.  King (2004), for example, found that more than half of 
students who filed FAFSA’s in 1999-2000 missed the April 1
st deadline to be eligible for additional 
state and institutional aid programs.  Most of our sample received their treatment in February or 
March, long before this deadline.  Finally, as found in research concerning the enrollment process 
into retirement plans, the complex process of the FAFSA may provoke some families to 
procrastinate.  Minimizing the time and effort necessary to complete the FAFSA may therefore make 
individuals more likely to spare the time. 
  To study the effects of these interventions, we track the submission of aid applications, 
college enrollment, and financial aid awards of participants using data made available through 
collaborative partnerships with the U.S. Department of Education (DOE) and the National Student 
Clearinghouse (NSC).  The analysis suggests that individuals who received assistance with the 
FAFSA and information about aid were substantially more likely to submit the aid application. High 
school seniors and recent high school graduates among this group were also 25-30 percent more   4
likely to enroll in college.  Similarly, the program increased college enrollment among low-income 
adults with no prior college experience.  The program also increased grant receipt for all participants 
in our treatment groups, including those who had previously enrolled in college.  These results 
suggest that direct help with the application process and providing better information could be 
effective ways to improve college access.  However, only providing aid information without 
assistance with the form had no significant effect on aid application rates or college enrollment.  
 
 
II.  LITERATURE REVIEW AND BACKGROUND ON THE EXPERIMENT 
Prior Literature 
There is a long literature examining the effects of financial aid and price on attendance (e.g., 
Kane 2003, Seftor and Turner 2002, Dynarski 2000 and 2003, Manski and Wise 1983), college 
choice (e.g., Long 2004; Avery and Hoxby 2004, Van der Klauuw 2002), and persistence (e.g., 
Bettinger 2004).  While price and financial aid influence decisions about college, many remain 
puzzled as to why some aid programs have not been more effective in spurring increased enrollment 
among targeted groups.
4  Some theorize this is due to low visibility and the complexity of the aid 
process, and in recent years there has been increasing interest in understanding the role of the 
application process on socioeconomic outcomes.  For example, at the direction of Congress, the 
Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance (ACSFA) examined the federal aid system and 
concluded: 
“Millions of students and adult learners who aspire to college are overwhelmed by the 
complexity of student aid.  Uncertainty and confusion rob them of its significant benefits. 
Rather than promote access, student aid often creates a series of barriers – a gauntlet that the 
poorest students must run to get to college” (ACSFA, 2005, p. i). 
                                                 
4 For example, researchers have not found large enrollment responses after the introduction of some financial aid 
programs, such as the Pell Grant in 1972 (Manski and Wise 1983, Hansen 1983, Kane 1996).  See also GAO (2005).   5
The FAFSA application is at the center of policy discussions about reducing the complexity 
of the application process.  The 2008 FAFSA was eight pages long and contained over 100 questions.  
To answer three of these questions, applicants had to complete three additional worksheets with 
nearly 40 additional questions.  As shown by Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2006), the FAFSA is four 
times longer than the simplest tax return (i.e., IRS Form 1040EZ) and longer than IRS Form 1040.  
Even the lowest-income individuals, who have already established their eligibility for other federal 
means-tested programs, must complete this long application to receive aid for which they are almost 
certainly eligible.
5  In addition, the timing of the application process is troublesome.  Individuals 
cannot submit the FAFSA until the January of the year of college entry.  Therefore, they often must 
apply to college before even knowing with certainty whether they can afford it. Even after 
completing a FAFSA, applicants learn only what the government expects their family can pay (i.e. 
the Expected Family Contribution or EFC), and applicants hence cannot predict the exact amount of 
their potential aid package.     
The complexity of the current federal financial aid system is even more apparent when 
comparing the existing application process to the processes of other financial aid programs shown to 
be effective.  For example, the Social Security Student Benefit (SSSB) Program used a very simple 
application process in providing college financial aid to the children of dead, disabled, or retired 
Social Security beneficiaries.
6  Dynarski (2003) finds that the elimination of the program led to large 
reductions in college enrollment and eventual educational attainment. Similarly, the Georgia Hope 
Scholarship, which provides aid to students with at least a B-average, was heavily advertised and the 
application process was simplified.  Researchers have  found that Georgia's program had a 
surprisingly large impact on college attendances rates (Dynarski, 2000; Cornwell, Mustard, and 
Sridhar, 2006).   
                                                 
5 Students who are already in college must also redo the FAFSA in a timely fashion each year to renew their aid, 
which may cause some students to lose their aid. 
6 The program did not require students to seek out the aid themselves nor was the application process complicated. 
The government notified eligible students that they could receive the aid, and students only needed to return a short 
form to get the benefit.     6
Complexity is not the only problem with the process.  Lack of information appears to be 
another significant barrier.  Potential students must first know about the existence of aid in order to 
access it, yet youth and their parents are generally unaware of aid opportunities.  For instance, a 2002 
Harris Poll found that nearly two-thirds of all parents and young adults planning to go to college did 
not name grants as a possible source of funds when asked about types of financial aid.  Low-income 
families often have less information than other families about how to pay for college (Sallie Mae 
Fund, 2003).  Given these patterns, it is not surprising that many students eligible for aid do not apply 
for it. King (2004) estimates that over 10 percent of all college students in 2000 did not complete 
financial aid forms even though they would have been eligible for a Pell Grant had they done so.  
The same patterns can be found with state aid programs that also use the FAFSA.  In California, as 
many as 19,000 students who would have qualified for a Cal Grant, a need-based aid program, failed 
to apply (Sturrock, 2002).   
Lack of information about the true costs of college may pose an additional barrier to 
enrollment.  ACSFA (2005) notes that students and families, as well as adult learners, are often 
intimidated by news reports about record increases in the college costs of the most selective 
universities and other impressions that college is unaffordable.  These stories may contribute to the 
fact that individuals, particularly low-income individuals, often greatly overestimate the cost of 
higher education (Horn, Chen, and Chapman 2003).  Among individuals participating in our study, 
we asked a subsample to report on the average costs of college and found that participants 
overestimated the costs by over 300 percent.
7  Oreopoulos and Dunn (2009) find high school students 
are more likely to aspire going to college three weeks after being provided accurate information 
about costs and benefits.  
Policymakers and researchers are increasingly aware that the design of a program can affect 
its take-up and effectiveness. As mentioned above, researchers have shown for other programs that 
                                                 
7 The average annual tuition at a two-year, public college in Ohio was $3,099.  In contrast, the median estimate 
among our participants was $9,999.  Dependents guessed $8,500 at the median, and independents guessed $10,000.     7
making sign-up automatic, simplifying the information distributed, or reducing the number of 
choices individuals need to make to sign-up can have large effects on participation. The extent to 
which these types of changes would affect college aid applications and enrollment, however, is 
unknown.  Our project is designed to address this hole in the literature. 
 
The FAFSA Experiment 
We developed this experiment in collaboration with H&R Block.  On January 2, 2008, the 
program was implemented in most of Ohio and the Charlotte, North Carolina area (a total of 156 tax 
preparation offices).
8  After a person completed their taxes in an H&R Block office, they were 
instantly screened for eligibility. Software we developed for the project identified families with 
incomes less than $45,000, as measured by the adjusted gross income reported on the tax return, who 
also had a family member between the ages of 15 and 30 who did not already have a bachelor's 
degree.  These criteria map onto two samples of interest.  The first is high school seniors and recent 
graduates who are typically dependent upon their parents financially.
9  The second group is 
independent adults (often referred to as non-traditional students).  In cases where there was more 
than one eligible member in the household, we picked the independent adult in the office closest to 
age 18. After identifying an eligible participant, the H&R Block tax professional introduced the 
project explaining that we hoped “to learn how people make decisions about college and how to pay 
for it, as well as find out how H&R Block can best help its families navigate college finances.”  The 
participant was also offered $20 for their time.  If interested, the tax professional then asked the 
                                                 
8 H&R Block invited proposals of interventions that would benefit low- and moderate-income families, have 
national scalability, and inform important and timely policy debates.  After being selected through a competitive, 
peer-reviewed process, the team worked from spring 2006 to winter 2007 to develop the necessary procedures and 
software. Based on feedback from focus groups and analysis of the operational data from the pilot conducted 
January to April 2007, we finalized the procedures for the 2008 implementation. 
9 In practice, most of our sample of younger students was age 17 at the time of the tax interview.  This is because the 
FAFSA typically considers students under the age of 24 as dependent on their parents unless they are married, have 
a child, or are veterans.  In these cases (in which the student is defined as a "dependent"), parental income is 
required for the FAFSA, and so we focused on cases where a parent was completing taxes and the student was 
declared a dependent on the tax forms.    Individuals age 24 or older are automatically considered "independent" by 
FAFSA standards, and parental information is not needed for the FAFSA.   8
individual to complete a statement of informed consent.  Once individuals consented, we asked study 
participants general questions about their backgrounds and higher education perceptions.  Then, we 
randomly assigned individuals to one of three groups:  
1.  FAFSA Simplification and Assistance with Aid Eligibility Information (i.e., the FAFSA 
Treatment) 
For the main treatment group, we helped individuals complete the FAFSA.  Our software 
first used individuals’ tax returns to pre-populate about two-thirds of the questions on the 
FAFSA.  Then, it led the H&R Block tax professional through an interview protocol to gather 
answers to the remaining questions, which took less than 10 minutes. These questions mostly 
concerned relatively straightforward information such as parental education, educational 
goals, and the number of children in the household currently attending college.  After the 
interview protocol, the software computed the amount of financial aid the client was eligible 
to receive from the federal and state governments and provided a written explanation of these 
numbers (a sample award letter appears in the appendix).
10 The aid amounts reported to 
participants focused on need-based aid (e.g., the Pell Grant and the Ohio College Opportunity 
Grant) as well as federal loans. In reporting potential aid packages, we also presented the 
tuition prices of four nearby public four- and two-year colleges.
11  If all of the information 
necessary to complete the FAFSA was obtained by the tax professional during this initial 
visit, we then offered to have H&R Block submit the FAFSA electronically to the DOE free 
of charge; otherwise, families were sent the completed paper FAFSA by mail to submit 
themselves. If we still needed to collect additional information, an external call center 
                                                 
10 If we could not collect all the information needed for the office during the initial office visit, we still tried to 
compute the amount of aid students were eligible to receive.  Typically we were only missing data that is irrelevant 
to the aid calculation (e.g. driver’s license number).  In other cases, we were missing information on specific income 
sources not listed on the tax return but needed for the FAFSA (e.g. SSI benefits).  
11 For each region, we chose four plausible colleges based on enrollment patterns for that region.  The schools were 
a mix of open admissions and large, slightly selective institutions.   9
contacted the family to ask the remaining questions and offered to submit the form.
12 We 
completed the FAFSA for nearly seven out of ten in either the office or using the call center 
staff.
13 
2.  Aid Eligibility Information only  (i.e., the Information-Only Treatment) 
For this group, we calculated individualized aid eligibility estimates using information from 
the tax return that the participant had just completed at the H&R Block office.  We also gave 
individuals a written description of their aid eligibility and a list of the tuitions of four nearby 
colleges.  To receive the aid amounts, the tax professional then encouraged individuals in this 
group to complete the FAFSA on their own (no help was given on the form as the emphasis 
for this group was only on providing information). 
3.  Control Group (no intervention) 
For this group, we only provided a brochure with basic information about the importance of 
going to college and general information on costs and financial aid.  We constructed the 
brochure using information readily accessible online and elsewhere with the goal that this 
information would not likely affect a participant’s behavior.   As such, this group is our key 
comparison group for determining the effects of the other interventions. The brochure was 
also given to the treatment groups. 
To summarize, the interventions were designed to test a program aimed at increasing college 
information and to simplify the financial aid application process.  The key outcome upon which we 
focus is college enrollment and aid receipt.  For students already attending college, the intervention 
aimed to help them get additional financial aid support, which could impact the likelihood of college 
persistence. 
                                                 
12 Most often FAFSAs were not completed in the office because the family needed to supply additional information 
such as other sources of income like veteran’s benefits or the child’s driver’s license number. 
13 Completion rates differed slightly by type of participant.  Among independent students with no prior college 
experience, 54 percent completed their FAFSAs in the office and another 24 percent were completed with the help 
of the Call Center (for a total completion rate of 78 percent).  Among dependent students, 11 percent completed the 
FAFSA by the end of the Call Center outreach process and another 66 percent nearly completed the form (having at 
least 91 of the 103 FAFSA items).  FAFSAs with missing fields may still have been deemed complete enough to 
submit.   10
Table 1 outlines our recruitment process including the consent rates for our respective 
treatment and control groups.
14  During the tax season, H&R Block met with 236,483 clients in the 
targeted offices.  Of this group, 69,031 clients met the study’s initial criteria (having an AGI less than 
$45,000 and a family member age 15 to 30), 35,793 expressed interest in learning more about college 
(52 percent of clients meeting the study's criteria), and 26,401 qualified for the study after answering 
in the affirmative that the target participant did not already have a bachelor’s degree (74 percent of 
those expressing interest).
15  Nearly all of the individuals expressing interest verbally consented to 
participate in the project (26,168 individuals).  Participants did not formally sign the consent form 
until the end of the interview, and a small number left before doing so. For the sample of dependent 
students, we find no statistically significant difference in the written consent rates across our 
treatment groups.  For independent adults, the differences in consent rates are marginally significant 
at the 10 percent level.  This is more likely due to the large sample (55,083) than because of real 
differences, especially given that randomization had not yet occurred. The “Sample with Complete 
Data” column in Table 1 reports the percentage of each group for whom we received a paper copy of 
the consent form. Some tax professionals mistakenly sent the signed copies of the consent forms 
home with the study participants, and we are prohibited from matching outcomes without proof of a 
signed consent form.  As a result, we had to exclude some individuals who initially consented to 
participate.  Importantly, however, the reasons tax professionals and district managers gave for not 
submitting paper consent forms were unrelated to treatment status.
16  The last column of Table 1 
                                                 
14 The dependent sample figures include both high school seniors and recent graduates, who are examined in this 
paper, as well as participants who were high school sophomores and juniors, who will be examined in future, 
separate work.   
15 The primary reasons why some individuals did not qualify for the study was that they already had college degrees, 
or were not considered independent by federal aid standards and so would need information from other family 
members not present in the office in order to complete the FAFSA.  Among those who qualified, tax professionals 
during focus groups suggested that about half of those that expressed interest were initially attracted to the $20 
discount, and the other half were interested because they wanted more information about college.   
16 In focus groups with tax professionals, they identified two main reasons why H&R Block central processing unit 
did not receive a written copy of the consent form.  First, many tax professionals accidentally sent all of the written 
copies of the consent form home with the client.  Second, many tax professionals filed the consent form with the tax 
documentation rather than submitting the form to H&R Block’s central processing center.  In both cases, we had   11
shows how important subsamples upon which we focus vary across the treatment groups.  The first 
panel shows the fraction of initially-screened dependents who were high school seniors for whom we 
have written informed consent for and were eligible to apply for the FAFSA (a total 866 individuals).  
The bottom panel shows the fraction of initially-screened independents who had no prior college 
experience for whom we have written consent (a total of 9,237 individuals).  We also analyze the 
sample of independent students with college experience for whom we have consent (6,637 total 
individuals).  The sample size for dependent students is much smaller than that for independent 
adults due to the fact that H&R Block served a limited number of families with a student under the 
age of 18 who was a high school senior or a recent high school graduate.
17   
  During the experiment, we had several ways of assuring faithful implementation. First, the 
software had a number of internal checks.  It not only tracked completion of each question, but it also 
prompted and reminded the tax professional what questions they should ask at each point of the 
interview and tracked the time taken for each question. H&R Block also monitored treatment fidelity 
through field visits.  H&R Block received no reports of any serious deviation from the script from the 
field offices.  If a problem arose, we immediately integrated new procedures and training modules to 
accommodate special circumstances. 
Across all of the subgroups we analyze, we randomly assigned participants who consented to 
the respective groups as follows: 7,864 to the FAFSA assistance and aid interpretation group; 1,319 
to the Information-only group; and 7,557 to the Control group.  The information-only is noticeably 
smaller as its only purpose was to detect differences in FAFSA submission rates compared to the 
Control and FAFSA assistance groups, not to detect small differences in college enrollment.
18 For the 
                                                                                                                                                             
little recourse in retrieving the consent forms; however, we were able to identify which tax professionals made these 
mistakes and train them so that they did not repeat the mistakes.   
17 Also, the informed consent process was a limiting factor.  Parents could consent that their dependent child could 
participate if their dependent was under the age of 18 at the time of the interview.  If a student was 18 or older, we 
needed both the parent’s and child’s consent to enroll them in the study.  Most of these students do not accompany 
their parents to H&R Block, and in our 2007 pilot, we were unable to achieve a high consent rate with this group.  
Hence, we focus on the 17-year old high school seniors. 
18 With a control mean of 0.2, the sample size gives us about 80 percent statistical power to detect a 3 percentage 
point difference in FAFSA submission rates at the 5 percent significance level.   12
FAFSA Treatment group, we collected a sample size large enough to study the impact of the 
intervention on both FAFSA submission and college attendance.  Because college enrollment is a 
lower probability event, we needed a much larger sample size.  To study the effects of these 
interventions, we track the submission of applications for financial aid, college enrollment patterns, 
and the financial aid awards of participants using data made available through collaborative 
partnerships with the DOE and NSC.  Each linked the participant information made available by 
H&R Block to their databases.  Several pieces of information are available. First, from the NSC, we 
observe the institution attended and full and part-time enrollment status.
19 Second, from the DOE, we 
observe whether the individual ever submitted a FAFSA.  Third, we observe the amount of financial 
aid paid out by the federal government for each student.  Using these data, we are able to 
demonstrate the effects of the intervention on the likelihood of submitting an aid application, college 
attendance, and financial aid receipt. 
 
 
III. EMPIRICAL  FRAMEWORK 
Data – Descriptive Statistics  
In Table 2, we report basic descriptive statistics for three key groups: dependent students 
(i.e., high school seniors), independent adults who have not previously attended college, and 
independent adults with some previous college experience.  For each group, we report the means for 
the control group and the differences (and their standard errors) with the treatment groups.  Random 
assignment should assure that our treatment and control groups are balanced and comparable.  Our 
algorithm for randomizing clients depended completely on the last two digits of the taxpayer's social 
                                                 
19 The NSC is a non-profit organization that provides national student degree and enrollment verification for 
schools, colleges, and employers.  Founded in 1993, it currently serves as a central repository for the institutions of 
92 percent of college students.     13
security number, and the software automatically made the treatment assignment.
20  While one might 
expect some small discrepancies, we should largely observe that there are no significant differences 
between the control and treatment groups.  As shown in Table 2, this is the case.   
Among the sample of dependent participants, over 56 percent of the sample is female. The 
racial distributions are also similar across treatment groups with comparable proportions of white, 
black, and Hispanic participants.  In the control group, 55 percent of participants were white and 
about 38 percent of participants were black.  Among the information-only treatment group, the 
proportion of white participants was higher while the proportion of black participants was lower, but 
these differences are not statistically significant.  The average age of the dependent sample was about 
17.7 at the time of the interview across all three groups.
21   
Across the groups about 85-88 percent of the samples were high school seniors according to 
the parents.  The others had either graduated from high school or had left high school and completed 
a GRE.  While most parents identified their children as being high school seniors, we searched the 
NSC records to see if any of these participants had a history of previously taking a college course.  In 
our control and FAFSA treatment groups, nearly 6 percent of participants reported that they had 
previously enrolled in college.  These enrollments could represent a single course at a campus or 
being in a dual enrollment program.  The percentage was higher for the information-only treatment 
group had previous enrollment.  About 40 percent of parents reported that their children would be 
targeting a bachelor's degree while 22 percent of parents reported their children’s target degree would 
be an associate's degree.  The remaining parents indicated their child would be targeting a 
                                                 
20 Tax professionals could not override the screen prompts that were dependent on treatment status, and did not 
know the nature of the treatment assignment algorithm. In focus groups, the tax professionals, confirmed that they 
did not know which group individuals had been assigned to until the software made the assignment, which occurred 
after the informed consent process. 
21 In prior versions of the paper, we also included comparisons of parental education levels.  For the dependent 
participant sample, about 58- 63 percent of participants in the respective treatment groups had fathers and/or 
mothers with a high school level of education.  For mothers, 26-30 percent had completed some college while 16-19 
percent of fathers had completed some college.  The rest of the parents’ education levels were either unknown or 
junior high.  There were no significant differences in parental education levels across treatment groups.   14
professional certificate or indicated that they did not know.  Family's average incomes were about 
$23,000 while their taxable incomes were near $6,000.   
  For the dependent participant sample, we find no statistically significant differences between 
the control group and the FAFSA treatment group or between the control group and the information-
only treatment group. Because of our sample sizes, we have sufficient power to identify even small 
differences in the groups.  Hence our failure to find differences is an affirmation of our 
randomization.   
  The rest of Table 2 shows the results for the independent adults, with separate columns for 
those with and without prior college experience.  We partitioned the sample into those with and 
without prior college experience based on college enrollment records from NSC.  We distinguish 
between these groups because participants who had previously attended college would have already 
navigated the college application and enrollment process at least once, and we wanted to examine 
whether the effects of the interventions would differ for this group (some of this group was still 
currently in college).  Comparing the control and treatment groups, there are very few differences.  
As is evident from the control group means, larger differences exist across the independent 
participants with and without college experience.  Among the sample of independent adults, about 64 
percent of participants with prior college experience were female while about 57 percent of 
participants without prior college experience were female.  Slightly more than 71 percent of 
independents without prior college experience were white, but for those with previous college 
experience the proportion was about 64 percent. Participants were 26 years old on average across 
groups of independent participants and across treatments.   
The proportions of independent adults focusing on bachelors and associates degrees were 
similar within the various treatment groups but very different across independent participants with 
and without previous college experience.  Participants who had previously attended college were 
more likely to pursue a bachelors or associates degree.  Income levels were similar across treatment 
groups but different according to whether or not participants had previous college experience.  Those   15
with previous college experience had incomes that were about $1500 to $2000 more than those with 
no previous college experience. 
  For the sample of participants without prior college experience, we find no significant 
differences between the FAFSA treatment and control groups, and we find only two significant 
differences between the information-only treatment and control groups. Participants in the 
information-only treatment group were slightly younger and had less income.  These two differences 
are significant at the 10 percent level.  For the sample of participants with prior college experience, 
we also find no differences between our FAFSA treatment group and the control group.  We find, 
however, a few differences with the information-only treatment group in terms of gender, marital 
status, the likelihood of being a current college student, and in target degree being a bachelor's 
degree.   
The differences found should not cause major concern as one would have expected some 
false positives.  Additionally, we have a smaller sample for the information-only treatment, so there 
may be some possibility that the sample is not balanced in some characteristics.  However, when we 
formally test whether the coefficients across all characteristics in Table 2 are jointly different from 
zero for any of our subsamples, we fail to reject that the observed differences are collectively zero.  
In the analysis, we control for covariates to account for any imbalance that may exist between the 
information-only treatment and our control group.   
 
Empirical Strategy 
Because the proposed treatment was administered using randomization, simple comparisons 
of participants in the various treatments can identify the relative effects of the interventions.  Our 
control group (i.e. those receiving only a brochure of basic information) is compared to our treatment 
groups.  We estimate both the effects of offering the service (intent-to-treat effects) and the effects of 
using the service among individuals for which a FAFSA is filed (treatment–on-the-treated effects).  
The "intent-to-treat" (ITT) effect can be estimated with the following regression:   16
(1)     i i i i i bX INFO FAFSA y ε δ δ δ + + + + = * * 2 1 0  
where y is an outcome for individual i, FAFSA represents whether H&R Block offered individual i 
the first treatment – assistance with completing the FAFSA and a personalized aid estimate, and 
INFO represents whether H&R Block offered individual i the second treatment – an estimate of the 
amount of financial aid he or she is eligible for at area colleges but no help with the FAFSA.   
Additional controls, X, include variables such as age, gender, race, and family income.  The 
outcomes of interest whether a FAFSA was filed, whether the participant enrolled in college the 
following school year, whether they enrolled full- or part-time, and whether they received financial 




Program Effects on FAFSA Submission 
Table 3 reports estimated treatment effects on the likelihood of submitting a FAFSA to the 
DOE for the school term immediately following the intervention.  Filing status is regressed on 
indicators for whether the participant was exposed to simplification and information (the FAFSA 
treatment) or the information-only treatment using robust standard errors with and without 
background controls.
22  Among dependent students, 40.2 percent of the control group went on to file 
a FAFSA. In contrast, those who were offered help completing the form through our study were 15.7 
percentage points more likely to file (column 1), which corresponds to a 40 percent increase (p-
value<.01).  The FAFSA treatment effect is similar with and without including controls for gender, 
race, age, previous college experience, and parental education and income. 
The information-only treatment did not have a substantial effect on aid application 
submission.  Participants who received only information about their likely grant and loan eligibility 
relative to college costs were no more likely to file a FAFSA than the control group, though the small 
                                                 
22 Our results are robust if we cluster our standard errors at the level of the tax professional or tax office.    17
sample size of dependent children in this treatment group makes it difficult to rule out a possible 
effect for this group.  However, we can rule out at the 5 percent significance level that the FAFSA 
assistance and information-only treatment effects are the same.  There was a clear, large effect for 
those who received the FAFSA treatment.  
Columns 3 and 4 focus on the sample of independent adult participants with no prior college 
experience.  The fraction who filed a FAFSA among independent adults out of school is, not 
surprisingly, smaller than that among dependents about to graduate from high school or with recent 
high school degrees. 13.8 percent of the control group of independents without prior college 
experience filed the aid application.  The FAFSA treatment effect on filing, however, is very large: a 
near tripling of the FAFSA submission rate to the DOE, from 13.8 percent to 39.5 percent.   
Meanwhile, the information-only treatment had essentially no impact on filing. 
Columns 5 and 6 show results for the independent sample who had previously attended 
college.  These individuals were either still in college, had taken college courses in high school, or 
had stopped out of college before graduating.  The FAFSA filing rate for the control group was 35.3 
percent.  This rate rose by 20.4 percentage points for the FAFSA treatment group, to 55.7 percent.  
As with the other samples, however, the information-only treatment appears to have had no effect on 
filing status. 
 
Program Effects on College Enrollment 
  Table 4 shows the estimated Intent-to-Treat (ITT) effects on college enrollment during the 
fall immediately after participation in the program using data from the NSC.  Column 1 reports a 
remarkable increase in college enrollment for dependent participants in the FAFSA treatment group.  
Enrollment rates increased from 26.8 percent among the control group to 34.5 percent, or a relative 
increase of about 29 percent.  Adding demographics and family background controls to the estimates 
in Column 2 generally does not change the results.  They do show, however, that females are much 
more likely to enroll.  A mother with a college degree and taking a previous college course are also   18
strong predictors for a child going to college regardless of treatment status.  The overall estimated 
results are fairly similar across both the Ohio and North Carolina.
23   
  Columns 3 and 4 show estimated effects for the larger independent sample with no prior 
college enrollment.  The absolute difference in enrollment rates between the FAFSA treatment and 
control groups is small (0.6 percentage points), but because the control group mean is small as well 
(2.9 percent), this translates into a relative increase of 20.6 percent (3.5 percent compared to 2.9 
percent).  The difference is almost statistically significant with a p-value of 0.14.  The 2.9 percent 
attendance rate for the control group and the observed treatment effect of 0.006 are likely 
underestimates of the true rates in this population.  As we later show in Table 5 using data from the 
DOE, 9.6 percent of the control group for the participants with no prior college experience received 
some type of financial aid.  The difference between the 9.6 percent and the 2.9 percent rates for the 
control group is made up of students who attended colleges which do not participate in the NSC.  
Using data from other sources, we show below that the estimates are at least as large as observed in 
Table 4 and may even be much larger than what is observed in that table.  We elaborate on this below 
during our discussion of Table 5.   
For independents who had previous college experience, the mean enrollment rate was much 
higher than that for other independents, but we find no significant differences between treatment and 
control groups:  23.7 percent of the control group is enrolled compared to 24.3 percent of the FAFSA 
treatment group (p-value=.59). In the sample of independents with prior college experience, we are 
less concerned that our estimates may be downward biased.  We defined prior college enrollment 
using the NSC data, so these students have already attended or were attending an NSC school.  These 
students were likely to stay in these institutions where we have excellent coverage from the NSC. 
                                                 
23 About 88 percent of our analysis sample is from Ohio, so we do not have, particularly in the case of dependent 
students, significant power to discern between the effects in the two states.  When we look at the point estimates, the 
point estimates are larger in North Carolina than in Ohio for the dependent students and vice-versa for the 
independent students.     19
  For all samples, our estimated effects for the information-only treatment group are 
insignificant.  The point estimates are always small, but given our small sample size, the estimated 
standard error bands remain generous. As noted above, the principal goal of including this treatment 
group was to test the effect of information alone on FAFSA filing behavior. Given we failed to find 
an effect of the information-only treatment on FAFSA submission rates in Table 3, we interpret the 
lack of finding an enrollment effect in Table 4 as not surprising. 
 
Program Effects on Financial Aid Receipt 
  In Table 5, we extend the analysis by examining the effects of the treatments on the receipt of 
financial aid.  According to data from the DOE, about 29.8 percent of dependent participants in our 
control group received a Pell Grant, the primary need-based federal award.  The FAFSA treatment 
substantially increased this rate by 9.8 percentage points, or about a relative 33 percent increase.  For 
independent participants with no prior college experience, our estimated treatment effect is 2 
percentage points, or about 20 percent.  For independent participants who had previously attended 
college, the FAFSA treatment effect was about 3 percentage points, or 13 percent.   
In Table 5, we observe that individuals with prior college experience in our treatment group 
were 3 percentage points more likely to receive grant aid.  However, we find no enrollment effect in 
Table 4 and in our effort to account for potential biases in the NSC measure of attendance.  Together 
these findings confirm prior research suggesting that some eligible college enrollees do not apply for 
aid.  Additionally, although it is somewhat hard to interpret given that the treatment had effects on 
aid receipt, we find that the size of financial aid awards was larger for students in the FAFSA 
treatment.  Moreover, there was a 2 percentage point increase in student loan receipt among these 
students.  Therefore, while the FAFSA experiment did not necessarily increase enrollment rates 
among this group, it did increase access to financial aid.  Much like our results on FAFSA 
submission rates, we detect no statistically significant effects of the information-only treatment on 
aid receipt or financial aid award sizes.     20
In the bottom half of Table 5, we explore whether the treatments had an effect on FAFSA 
filing conditional on enrollment.  Our results on grant aid receipt suggest that some independent 
participants with prior college experience would have received financial aid had they completed the 
FAFSA.  If this is true, we should also find a treatment effect on the FAFSA filing behavior of 
students who attended college after the intervention.  For our control group, 84.1 percent of 
independents who had prior college experience and attended college after the experiment filed a 
FAFSA.   Corresponding independents in the FAFSA treatment group were 4.0 percentage points 
more likely to file.  This reinforces that while we can rule out large impacts on enrollment for 
independents who had college experience prior to the study, providing information and assistance did 
increase the fraction of those filing while in college and as we showed above it increased access to 
grant and loan aid as well.  We find no effects on filing behavior among those in the information-
only treatment. 
For many states and institutions, there are binding deadlines for applying for financial aid.
24  
In Table 5, we also compare the timing of FAFSA applications among filers.  Given that there was a 
treatment effect on FAFSA filing, it is somewhat difficult to interpret these results. The estimated 
difference in the time to file is a weighted average of the effect of the program on filing timing for 
participants who would have filed regardless of the experiment and the timing of participants who 
were newly induced to file because of the program and would not have filed otherwise.  If the timing 
of new-filers is slower than the average participant, then the comparisons would be biased 
downward.  However, the timing results reinforce the idea that the FAFSA intervention accelerated 
the aid application submission process.  Among dependent students in the control group, the average 
filing date was around May 11
th.  Participants in the FAFSA treatment filed their FAFSA's almost 
one month (32.6 days) earlier.  For independent participants without prior college experience, those 
treated filed FAFSA's almost 4 months earlier than the control group, and the treatment effect among 
                                                 
24 The earliest deadline among states is March 1
st.  Arizona, Idaho, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Rhode Island, 
Tennessee, and West Virginia all share this deadline.     21
independent students with prior college experience was a little over 2 months.  There was no 
treatment effect on the likelihood that dependent students filed before March 1
st; however, for 
independent students, there were large treatment effects for all independent students.  Among those 
without prior college experience, treated students were 55 percentage points more likely to file by 
March 1
st and among those with prior college experience, treated participants were 29 percentage 
points more likely to file by March 1
st.  It is also worth noting that independent adults without prior 
college experience who had the information-only treatment were also more likely to file earlier. 
  As noted above, a comparison of Tables 4 and 5 shows a major difference between the 
control group’s mean attendance rates (Table 4) and the rates at which participants received grant aid 
(Table 5).  In the dependent sample, 30 percent of participants in the control group received aid yet 
our attendance measure in Table 4 shows that 27 percent attended college.  Similarly, 2.9 percent of 
independent participants attended college according to the NSC data while 9.6 percent received grant 
aid according to the DOE data.  These discrepancies arise because of the lack of coverage of the NSC 
data.  The NSC data allow us to track college enrollments at about 92 percent of colleges and 
universities nationwide.
25  If NSC captures enrollment, it does so regardless of whether or not 
students applied for financial aid.  The DOE data, by contrast, covers all campuses that distribute 
federal financial aid but only tracks students if they applied for the aid.  Seven percent of dependent 
study participants and 16 percent of independent study participants attended college without filing a 
FAFSA. 
  To try to improve the NSC measures of college attendance, we acquired additional data from 
the Ohio Board of Regents (OBR).  OBR tracks enrollments at all 52 public two- and four-year 
colleges in Ohio.  Their data allow us to track individuals who attended public colleges in Ohio.  
They also allow us to check whether the measurement error in the NSC outcome measure is 
symmetric across treatment status.  These results appear in Table 6.  Column 1 reproduces the key 
                                                 
25 Students also have the option to request that their data not be matched to NSC.  Students exercise this option 
through their respective campus.  We cannot observe these students.   22
enrollment results from Table 4.  Since we have data for only Ohio, Column 2 estimates the effects 
of the program on enrollment for the Ohio students but using the NSC measure.  In the case of the 
independent adults with no prior college experience, the resulting estimates are positive and 
statistically significant.  The point estimates for the effects on the dependent sample from Ohio is still 
large in magnitude (4.7 percentage points), but with the reduced sample size, the estimates are no 
longer significant.   In Column 3, we estimate the effects of the program on enrollment using the 
OBR measure.  For the sample of independent students without prior college experience, the effects 
go up and remain significant.  The results, by contrast, for the dependent students fall and become 
insignificant suggesting the dependent effects are from enrollment increases in North Carolina and at 
private Ohio schools. 
  In the next columns, we try some refinements on our attendance measure.  We first combine 
the OBR and NSC measures.  We code students as attending college if either the OBR or the NSC 
identifies them as attending college.  We focus only on both Ohio and North Carolina students in the 
remaining tables.  The mean attendance rates in the control group go up by 3-4 percentage points in 
all of our samples, and the results are quite similar to our results in Table 4.  Enrollment effects are 
significant for the sample of dependent students but not for independent students.           
  While the OBR data improve our data coverage, it still does not perfect our estimates.    We 
are still missing four groups of students: 1) students in Ohio who attend private colleges which do not 
report to NSC; 2) students from Ohio who attend schools which do not report to NSC and which are 
located out of state; 3) students from North Carolina who attend colleges who  do not report to the 
NSC; and 4) students who asked NSC not to share their data.  To further understand the measurement 
error, we turned to data from the Department of Education.   
The DOE data identifies who among participants received the Pell Grant. Given that awards 
are conditional on attendance, another strategy would be to correct the NSC measure if students 
received Pell grants to attend school.  In Column 5, we report the results for the Pell grant receipt that 
were previously reported in Table 5.  In Column 6, we report the attendance measure where we mark   23
a student as attending college if they appear in the NSC data or if they received a Pell grant.  In 
Column 7, we report the results when we combine NSC, OBR, and DOE measures of attendance.  In 
this case, all of the treatment effects are larger and more statistically significant.  The key issue here 
is that the FAFSA intervention may have increased students’ likelihood of Pell receipt conditional on 
attendance as we showed in Table 5.  Hence, the DOE correction mixes both attendance and Pell 
receipt.  However, since the program likely did not have a negative effect on Pell receipt, the 
estimates with the DOE correction are likely an upper bound on the overall true effects. 
An alternative strategy would be to identify how FAFSA applications varied by treatment 
status.  In the FAFSA applications, we can identify all of the students who sent FAFSA data to 
colleges not covered by NSC.
26  Among our samples, 9.8 percent of dependent participants in the 
control group listed at least one school on the FAFSA that was not covered by NSC.  Similarly in our 
other samples’ control groups, 9.4 percent of independents without prior college experience and 12.9 
percent of independents with prior college experience listed at least one school not covered by NSC.  
However, the likelihood of sending FAFSA data to a school not covered by NSC was larger among 
independent participants without prior college experience who were in the FAFSA treatment group; 
they were 2 percentage points more likely to send their FAFSA to a school not in the NSC database.  
There are no statistically significant differences for our other samples.  This reinforces our previous 
statement that the error rate in the NSC measure is likely either balanced or perhaps even negatively 
biasing the treatment effects. 
    
Heterogeneous Enrollment Effects 
  In Table 7 and 8, we explore whether the program had heterogeneous effects among 
participants.  Table 6 focuses on college enrollment outcomes to examine whether the program 
treatments increased particular types of attendance.  The FAFSA treatment effect on enrollment 
                                                 
26 At the end of the FAFSA, individuals can designate up to four colleges or universities to have their FAFSA 
information sent.    24
occurred mostly from increases in public college enrollment.  Public college enrollment rose 5.0 
percentage points (p-value=.059) for the dependent sample, compared to 1.8 percentage points at 
private colleges (p-value=.233).  For the dependent students, we also find a doubling in the rate of 
attendance at selective colleges for those who received the FAFSA treatment.  Many selective 
colleges require applications prior to the start of college; however, the particular selective colleges 
which explain much of the treatment effect (e.g. Ohio University) had more deadlines in the middle 
of tax season during 2008.  Table 7 also shows that most of the increase in attendance rates came 
from full-time attendance as the estimate of the effect on part- and full-time enrollment is not much 
different than the estimate on full-time enrollment alone.   
Among independents without prior college experience, public college enrollment 
immediately following treatment rose slightly by 0.6 percentage points to 2.8 percent (p-value=.060).  
Basically none of these independent adults enrolled in private colleges (the fractions are 0.1 percent 
for the treated and controls).
27  Most participants attended non-selective, public colleges if they chose 
to attend college.  Among independents with no prior college experience, we detect no difference in 
part-time enrollment by treatment assignment, but we do find full-time enrollment rises .7 percentage 
points (p-value 0.016). For both of our independent participant samples, we find no effect of the 
treatment on the selectivity of the college attended.   
  Overall, the enrollment effects we find among independents are small, but nevertheless 
important given the low cost of the FAFSA treatment and the small numbers of adults not in school 
that actually go back.  To get a better idea of whether these effects are concentrated among particular 
subgroups, we estimated the FAFSA treatment impact for this sample by household income.  We 
interacted enrollment patterns with quartic polynomials for household adjusted gross income (AGI), 
separately for the control group and treated.  Figure 1 shows clearly that the FAFSA treatment 
affected mostly low-income households (those with an adjusted gross income less than $22,000).  
                                                 
27 We include proprietary schools in our listing of private schools.  Our results do not change if we break the private 
results down by whether or not the private school is a proprietary school.     25
Among this group, college enrollment is 4.0 percent for the FAFSA treatment compared to 2.9 
percent for the control group (p-value for the difference is 0.017).  Interestingly, the DOE’s 
Estimated Family Contribution (EFC), which is the amount the federal government calculates a 
family should be able to give something towards college expenses, begins to rise for households with 
incomes around $22,000.  In essence, the results suggest that independent participants in the 
treatment group who were told that their family was not expected to contribute towards college 
expenses were the one who were the most influenced to go to college by the FAFSA intervention.  
Conversely, individuals told that the government would only cover part of the costs of college were 
less likely to attend. 
  Subdividing the data by whether the EFC estimate sent to participants is estimated to be zero 
or positive leads to generally larger and significant effects for the former group, and insignificant 
effects for the latter.  Table 8 displays treatment effect estimates for the independent sample without 
prior college, split by whether EFC was estimated based on FAFSA information to be zero or 
positive.  The FAFSA treatment effect for the EFC=0 sample is 1.2 percentage points.  The effect 
when EFC>0 is -0.8 percentage points, but not statistically significant, and the Information-only 
treatment effect point estimates are close to zero.  Subdividing further by background characteristics 
and survey responses, we find larger FAFSA treatment effects for the groups generally one would 
expect.  The effects among independents with no prior college and EFC predicted to be zero are 
larger for those who, before treatment, expressed strong interest in college (a 1.8 percentage point 
increase in enrollment from treatment for this group), and for those who say some do not go to 
college because they have to work (a 3.4 percentage point increase).  The effects are also 
concentrated among females and those without dependent children.  With one exception (Black 
participants with EFC>0 in information-only treatment sample), all of the information-only treatment 
effect estimates, and the FAFSA treatment effects for the predicted EFC>0 sample are not 
significantly different from zero. 
   26
V. CONCLUSION 
The results of the H&R Block FAFSA experiment suggest that seemingly small changes to 
the college application process can have large effects on enrollment and the amount of aid received.  
Information about likely grant and loan eligibility on its own did not increase applications and 
enrollment, but this information plus personal assistance with filling out a simplified application 
form did. This is true for students who were just graduating from high school and for independent 
adults without prior college experience.  Even though we found no enrollment effect for non-
traditional students who had already spent time in college, the FAFSA treatment did improve FAFSA 
submission rates, increase the likelihood that these participants received financial aid, and increase 
the average amount of financial aid received.   
The effects of the FAFSA treatment are large, especially given the intervention’s low 
marginal cost.  The 8-minute treatment of providing FAFSA assistance cost about $2.50 per 
participant for tax professional training and time.  Software installation, maintenance and printing 
materials added roughly another $15.00 per participant.  The largest costs to the program were from 
call center support ($30.00 per participant) and participation incentives ($20.00 to participants, 
$20.00 to tax professionals).
28 These costs would likely fall significantly in a more automated and/or 
non-research setting.  Still, even at $87.50 per participant, the resulting 8 percentage point increase in 
college enrollment among the high school senior sample is particularly impressive.
29  At an average 
cost of $1,094 per participant ($87.50/0.08) for helping one dependent student get to college, the 
program can likely pay for itself if the subsequent average earnings are 2 percent higher or more.
30   
                                                 
28 There is also the cost in aid to consider from a redistributive perspective: $375 on average per dependent ($3,826 
on average for compliers), and approximately $100 on average per independent ($4,157 on average for compliers).  
29 The only other comparable estimate of an enrollment effect stems from the introduction of the Georgia Hope 
Scholarship (Dynarski 2000).  However, that effect was due to a $3,000 scholarship.  Moreover, that program and 
other interventions with large effects often go to students who would have enrolled anyway (Deming and Dynarski, 
2009).  Our estimate also far exceeds effects (or the lack thereof) found for the Pell Grant, which is also far more 
expensive per student. 
30 This assumes forgone earnings at $10,000 per year for two years, a salary for someone without college at age 20 
of $35,000 and a real earnings growth rate of 2 percent until age 65.  Discounting the earnings difference at 3 
percent leaves a present value increase in earnings of $5,721, and an increase in tax revenue of $1,716 at a 30   27
It remains to be seen whether the large enrollment effects from the FAFSA experiment 
translate to these real long-term benefits.  One concern is that the intervention nudged people into 
college who were not likely to receive a return from the additional schooling.   An important 
consideration to note, however, is that we helped with financial aid applications but not with actual 
college applications (another seemingly small obstacle that may inhibit individuals from enrolling).  
Compliers therefore had to take at least some initiative. In addition, the barriers preventing some 
from filling out the FAFSA are not necessarily the same as the barriers preventing some students 
from succeeding in college.  We will track subsequent enrollment and graduation outcomes for future 
analysis to explore these issues.      
The FAFSA Experiment’s main treatment effects operate through several possible 
mechanisms. A test of whether only providing information could explain the results failed to produce 
statistically significant effects. We thus reject the hypothesis that the information-only treatment had 
a similar effect on aid application submission rates as our FAFSA treatment, although we do not have 
enough statistical power to rule out information effects for younger students.  We also note that we 
gave students information very late in the college application and planning process, and it could be 
that early information could have a distinct impact relative to late information.
31 
Another key mechanism driving the results could be simplification.  By pre-populating the 
form with information already collected during the tax interview, we were able to greatly reduce the 
total completion time and the likelihood of not having the necessary remaining information on hand 
to finish the form in one sitting.  Moreover, our analysis suggests that completely automating FAFSA 
filing in the office for all treated participants would have led to even larger FAFSA filing effects than 
the ones our program generated.  Independents who had all necessary information collected in the 
office were given the choice of having H&R Block file their application directly with the Department 
                                                                                                                                                             
percent rate.  For independents, the rate of return would have to be about 4 percent for present value tax revenues to 
exceed cost per participant nudged to college under similar assumptions. 
31 Several access initiatives focus on giving middle and early high school students information about college and 
financial aid.     28
of Education or having a complete paper FAFSA sent to their home address to be signed and mailed 
using a pre-paid envelope provided.
32  Interestingly, almost the entire difference in FAFSA filing 
between the independent treatment and control groups comes from those choosing to file 
electronically.   Among those that chose to receive the paper FAFSA in the mail, there was no 
difference from the control group in terms of FAFSA filling rates (13.5 percent versus 13.8 percent, 
respectively).  Those who elected to receive the paper form are not a random subsample, and their 
preference to not have H&R Block submit the form could be indicative of less interest in college 
going.
33  However, the pattern is also consistent with the larger literature on the positive effects of 
simplification.   
Another key mechanism driving the results could be the personal assistance provided 
immediately after receiving tax preparation services in filling out the FAFSA. If the reason behind 
not filing is that some participants do not take the initiative to access the form, no amount of 
simplification to the FAFSA will help.  Springing on participants the opportunity to complete the 
form while already in the office likely lowered participants’ time and convenience costs (for 
example, compared to the costs from asking participants to travel to an office only to complete the 
FAFSA, or accosting them at home or on the street).  The assistance was also face-to-face, which 
allowed for immediate feedback and may have increased participant interest and trust.  
The FAFSA Experiment was not designed to distinguish between the relative effectiveness of 
simplification versus assistance, but we hope future research can shed additional light on this issue.  
The main purpose of the project was to explore whether small changes to the application process 
could make the difference between some individuals going to college or not, and the results clearly 
indicate this to be the case. The combination of pre-populating the FAFSA with tax information, 
                                                 
32 A number of obstacles prevented us from completing the FAFSA for every treated participant. First, dependents 
were usually not present, and the FAFSA application requires their signature.  Parents also sometimes did not know 
all the information required to complete the form for their children (for example, driver’s license number).   
33 Focus groups suggested that some participants felt they would be committing to go to college if they agreed to 
have H&R Block submit the file, while others preferred to visually see the application before sending it to the 
government.   29
providing face-to-face assistance, and making it easier to actually submit the form was highly 
effective, which has important implications as well for other benefit programs. On the other hand, 
simply informing high school seniors and older adults about their aid eligibility did not appear to 
improve the submission of financial aid applications, and this underscores the barriers imposed by 
the current FAFSA. The importance of reducing complexity and the time required to complete 
application forms for program take-up deserves more attention. 
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B.  Independent Students with Prior College Experience 
 
Notes:  Predicted enrollments are estimated separately using a 4
th order polynomial in adjusted gross income.   

























(number)  (Fraction of Individuals who Initially Qualified) 
A. DEPENDENT SAMPLE       
Control Group  46%  6438  0.532  0.413  0.403  0.400  0.302  0.062 
FAFSA Treatment Group  54%  7510  0.512  0.404  0.395  0.392  0.298  0.063 
Full Sample  100%  13,948  0.521  0.408  0.398  0.396  0.300  0.062 
                
F-test p-value (Testing of 




















(number)  (Fraction of Individuals who Initially Qualified) 
B. INDEPENDENT SAMPLE       
Control Group  46%  25,215  0.515  0.374  0.372  0.369  0.284  0.165 
FAFSA Treatment Group  46%  25,491  0.521  0.379  0.377  0.374  0.293  0.171 
Information-Only 
Treatment Group  8% 4377  0.511  0.367  0.365  0.361 0.283 0.167 
Full Sample  100%  55,083  0.518  0.376  0.374  0.371  0.288  0.168 
                
F-test p-value      0.274  0.287  0.216  0.144  0.060  0.208 
Notes:  The dependent sample figures includes both high school seniors and recent graduates, who are examined in this paper, as well as participants age 15-17, 
who will be examined in future work (they were not old enough to have enrolled in college yet).  The independent sample analyzed in this paper includes both 
those with and without prior college experience.  The last column of Panel B illustrates how the subsample without prior college experience varies across the 
treatment groups. To initially qualify for this study, families had to have an AGI less than $45,000 and a family member between the ages of 15 and 30 who did 
not already have a bachelor's degree.  After asking whether these potentially eligible families were interested in learning more about college (the column labeled 
"Expressed Interest"), the tax professional posed additional questions to check for eligibility and determine final qualification (column labeled "Final 
Qualification").  Nearly all of these participants agreed to give consent (column labeled "Accepted and Gave Consent") and then completed the office interview 
(column labeled "Finished Office Interview").  The column labeled "Analysis Sample with Complete Data" reports the percentage of each group for whom we 
have complete survey, tax, and FAFSA filing data.   In order for the data to be complete, a paper consent form had to be sent via snail mail to the central project 
office by the tax professional. In addition, the analysis sample excludes 4 cases because either pre-enrollment status was unknown or there was a discrepancy 
regarding graduation status. The three analytic samples examined in this paper are: 866 high school seniors from the dependent sample (0.062088*13,946), 9,237 
independent students with no prior college experience (0.16769*55,083), and 6,637 independent students with prior college experience (0.12049*55,083).   
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Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics and Differences by Treatment Status 
 Dependent  Participants  Independent Participants 
with No Prior College Experience 
Independent Participants 
with Prior College Experience 
 Control  FAFSA 
Treatment 
Info 
Treatment  Control  FAFSA 
Treatment 
Info 




Female 0.560  .019 
(.035) 
.014 
(.061)  0.573  -.001 
(.011) 
-.020 




White 0.553  .003 
(.036) 
.097 
(.059)  0.713  -.009 
(.010) 
.007 




Black 0.379  .014 
(.035) 
-.079 
(.057)  0.233  .006 
(.009) 
-.013 




Hispanic 0.023  -.005 
(.010) 
.002 
(.019)  0.025  .002 
(.003) 
-.002 






















Previous College Enrollment  0.056  .003 
(.017) 
.057 
(.037)  0 0  0  1  1 1 
Married       0.132  -.020 
(.013) 
.002 




Single       0.801  .023 
(.015) 
.002 




Divorced or Separated        0.066  -.002 
(.010) 
-.003 




Current College Student (self report)        0.070  -.029 
(.008) 
-.004 




Current High School Student  0.848  .022 
(.025) 
.013 
(.043)           
Target Degree Would Be Bachelor's  0.412  -.014 
(.035) 
-.024 
(.060)  0.275  -.006 
(.010) 
.005 




Target Degree Would Be Associate  0.222  .001 
(.030) 
-.010 
(.050)  0.297  .012 
(.010) 
.007 






















P-value on Chi-squared Test that all 
Coefficients are Zero   0.968  0.908   0.939  0.164    0.898  0.217 
Observations 396  390  80  4155  4350  732  3006  3124  507 
Notes: Standard deviations appear in parentheses for non-binary variables.  By FAFSA standards, dependent students are typically under the age of 24 and financially dependent 
on their parents.  In this case, most dependent participants in the sample are high school seniors.  Independent participants were over the age of 24 or married, had a child, a 
veteran, or an orphan. "Prior college experience" is defined using data from the National Student Clearinghouse.  
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Table 3.  OLS Regressions of the Effects on FAFSA Filing 
Dependent Variable = Filed a FAFSA with the U.S. Dept. of Education 
  Dependent  
Participants   
Independent Participants 




with Prior College 
Experience 
  Control Mean = .402    Control Mean = .138    Control Mean = .353 
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5)  (6) 
FAFSA Treatment  .157** 
(.035) 
.146** 
(.033)    .257** 
(.009) 
.257** 









(.055)    -.011 
(.013) 
-.013 




Female   .120** 
(.032)     .079** 
(.009)     .139** 
(.012) 
White   -.147 
(.090)     -.005 
(.028)     -.014 
(.031) 
Black   -.058 
(.091)     .050* 
(.028)     .092** 
(.032) 
Hispanic   -.019 
(.155)     -.016 
(.036)     .056 
(.053) 
Age (years)    .255** 
(.021)     -.010 
(.001)     -.013** 
(.002) 
Previous College 
Enrollment    .290** 
(.064)          
Father's Highest 
Educ = College    -.096 
(.065)     -.003 





Educ = High school    -.069 
(.053)     -.005 





Educ = College    .195** 









Educ = High school    .105 









Income (000's)    .0035** 
(.0014)     -.0032** 
(.0004)     -.0036** 
(.0006) 
Observations 866  866    9237  9237    6637  6637 
Notes:  Robust standard errors appear in parentheses.   
  38
Table 4.  OLS Regressions of Intention to Treat Effects on College Attendance using 
NSC Data 
Dependent Variable = College Attendance between April 15 and November 1, 2008 
  Dependent  
Participants   
Independent Participants 




with Prior College 
Experience 
  Control Mean = .268    Control Mean = .029    Control Mean = .237 
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5)  (6) 
FAFSA treatment  .077** 
(.033) 
.069** 
(.032)    .006 
(.004) 
.006 









(.051)    -.0007 
(.0070) 
-.001 




Female   .119** 
(.029)     .009** 
(.004)     .040** 
(.011) 
White   -.146 
(.091)     -.018 
(.013)     -.033 
(.029) 
Black   -.124 
(.092)     .001 
(.013)     -.027 
(.030) 
Hispanic   .064 
(.152)     -.010 
(.017)     .035 
(.050) 
Age (years)    .130** 
(.018)     -.003** 
(.001)     -.010** 
(.002) 
Previous College 
Enrollment    .338** 
(.070)          
Father's Highest 
Educ = College    .043 
(.060)     .001 





Educ = High school    .008 
(.046)     -.002 





Educ = College    .147** 









Educ = High school    .063 









Income (000's)    .0026** 
(.0013)     .00002 
(.00019)     -.0009* 
(.0005) 
Observations 866  866    9237  9237    6637  6637 
Notes: Enrollment is measured using the National Student Clearinghouse data.  Robust standard errors 
appear in parentheses.  
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Table 5.  OLS Regressions of the Effects on Aid Receipt and FAFSA Filing 
  Dependent Participants   Independent  Participants 
with No Prior College Experience    Independent Participants 
with Prior College Experience 




Mean  FAFSA 
Treatment 
Info-Only 
Treatment   
Control  
Mean  FAFSA 
Treatment 
Info-Only 
Treatment   
Control  




Received Any Pell Grant 
(not conditional on enrollment)  .298  .098** 
(.033) 
-.018 
(.051)   .096  .019** 
(.007) 
-.016 




Total Scheduled Amount of 

















Received Federal Student 
Loan  .232  .031 
(.030) 
-.065 
(.045)   .069  .004 
(.006) 
-.018** 




Filed FAFSA  
Conditional  on Attendance  .925  .034 
(.033) 
.011 
(.066)   .836  .116** 
(.036) 
.085 




Date of FAFSA Filing 2008 


















Filed FAFSA before March 
1, 2008 Conditional on Filing  .365  .039 
(.052) 
.006 
(.096)   .064  .554 
(.016) 
.038 




Notes: The outcomes are defined using data from the U.S. Department of Education.  Specifications include controls for race, gender, age, prior college 
experience, parents' education levels, and family income.  Robust standard errors appear in parentheses.  Total scheduled amount of grant aid includes all 
payments scheduled during the 2008-2009 school year.  Total paid reflects the actual amount of money transferred to schools as of March 2009.  This may differ 
from the scheduled amounts if students withdraw from school or transfer or if payments for a spring term have not yet been transferred to the students’ schools. 
The regressions with dependent participants have 868 observations, except for those that are conditional.  The samples are 264 if conditional on attendance and 
407 if conditional on FAFSA filing. The regressions with independent participants without prior college experience have 9237 observations.  The samples are 
295 if conditional on attendance and 2392 if conditional on FAFSA filing. The regressions with independent participants with prior college experience have 6637 
observations.  The conditional samples have 1594 if conditional on attendance and 2992 if conditional on FAFSA filing.  
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Table 6.  OLS Regressions of Intention to Treat Effects on College Attendance using Multiple Sources 
Dependent Variable = College Attendance between April 15 and November 1, 2008 
  Attendance 
(NSC) 
Attendance 
(NSC - Ohio Only)
Attendance (Ohio 
Only - OBR) 
Attend 




(NSC or DOE) 
Attend 
(NSC or DOE or OBR) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
INDEPENDENTS WITH NO PRIOR COLLEGE EXPERIENCE 
Control  Group Mean  .029  .028  .043  .054  .096  .105  .1112 




























              
INDEPENDENTS WITH PRIOR COLLEGE EXPERIENCE 
Control  Group Mean  .237  .237  .198  .279  .233  .316  .337 




























              
DEPENDENTS 
Control  Group Mean  .268  .271  .235  .313  .298  .356  .371 




























Notes: The NSC measure uses data from the National Student Clearinghouse.  The OBR data uses data only from the Ohio Board of Regents which covers 
Ohio’s 52 public colleges.  The DOE data includes the universe of students who received Pell grant awards and were hence attending.  Robust standard errors 
appear in parentheses. 
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Table 7.  OLS Regressions of the Effects on Patterns of Attendance Post Experiment 
 Dependent   
Participants 
(N = 868) 
 Independent  Participants 
with No Prior College Experience 
(N = 9237) 
 
Independent Participants 
with Prior College Experience 
(N = 6637) 




Mean  FAFSA 
Treatment 
Info-only 
Treatment   
Control 
Mean  FAFSA 
Treatment 
Info-only 
Treatment   
Control 




Attended Public  
College   .222  .050* 
(.030) 
.030 
(.050)   .022  .006* 
(.003) 
.001 





College  .048  .018 
(.016) 
-.025 
(.020)   .007  -.001 
(.002) 
-.002 




Attended Four-year  
Campus   .169  .043 
(.028) 
-.019 
(.043)   .009  .004* 
(.002) 
.003 




Attended Two-year  
Campus   .098  .027 
(.023) 
.027 
(.041)   .019  .001 
(.003) 
-.003 





College  .038  .040** 
(.017) 
.022 
(.028   .001  .001 
(.001) 
-.0011** 





College  .174  .014 
(.027) 
-.002 
(.045)   .024  .004 
(.003) 
.002 




Attended Full-time   .189  .054* 
(.029) 
-.017 
(.045)   .013  .007** 
(.003) 
-.004 




Attended Part-time or 
Full-time  .207  .056* 
(.030) 
.025 
(.048)   .020  .006* 
(.003) 
-.002 




Withdrew from College 
Fall 2008 (uncondit.)  .010  -.006 
(.006) 
-.012* 
(.006)   .001  .0002 
(.0008) 
.0001 




Notes: Enrollment is measured using the National Student Clearinghouse data.  Specifications include controls for race, gender, age, prior college experience, 
parents' education levels, and family income.  Robust standard errors appear in parentheses.  Selective colleges include those colleges classified by Barron’s 
guide as “most,” “highly,” or “very competitive.” 
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Table 8.  OLS Regressions of Intention-to-Treat Effects  
Independent Participants with No Prior College Experience 
Dependent Variable = College Attendance between April 15 and November 1, 2008 
  Participants with Estimated 
Expected Family Contribution (EFC) = 0 
 
 
Participants with Estimated 
Expected Family Contribution (EFC) > 0 
  FAFSA 
Treatment 
Info-Only 
Treatment  N  FAFSA 
Treatment 
Info-Only 
Treatment  N 
Full Sample  .012** 
(.005) 
-.002 
(.009)  6266   -.008 
(.006) 
.003 
(.011)  2971 





(.014)  3405   -.013 
(.013) 
-.004 






(.001)  2861   -.005 
(.005) 
.004 
(.010)  1771 
Some Do not Go 




(.020)  1250   .004 
(.012) 
.035 
(.021)  798 
Other Reasons Why 




(.010)  5016   -.012* 
(.007) 
-.011 
(.013)  2173 
Female  .015** 
(.006) 
-.008 
(.012)  3890   -.006 
(.010) 
.011 
(.018)  1388 
Male  .006 
(.008) 
.005 
(.013)  2376   -.009 
(.007) 
-.005 
(.013)  1583 
White  .010* 
(.005) 
.006 
(.010)  4598   -.008 
(.006) 
-.010 
(.011)  2467 
Black  .015 
(.011) 
-.028 
(.021)  1668   -.007 
(.018) 
.073** 






(.037)  387   -.012 
(.012) 
-.012 






(.009)  5879   -.008 
(.006) 
.004 
(.012)  2803 
Notes: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Specifications include controls for race, gender, age, prior 
college experience, parents' education levels, and family income    43 
Appendix Figure 1.   
Information and Aid Calculation Worksheet 
 
 
 
 
 
 